The paper focuses on Britain's relationship with Malaya shortly before and after its independence from the British Empire. The paper looks at the negotiations concerning the financial settlement prior to independence. Britain sought to keep Malaya within the Sterling Area at all costs, even after de jure convertibility had been achieved, due to its high dollar earning capacity, which remained important due to persistent trade deficits with the US since the end of the Second World War. The paper argues that this settlement, while seemingly very generous for an independent Malaya, was still very much intended to maintain Britain's role within the global economy, to ensure Sterling's status as an international currency, and to support conditions for British economic growth.
terms of the broader political economic environment Britain faced in the 1950s. White focuses more on Malayan-Asian trade patterns, while Harper focuses on the making of the post-colonial Malayan state -a similar focus as Amin and Stockwell, albeit in less radical terms. 7 Indeed, Harper notes that his goal was to understand decolonization "as seen from Malaya and not from London". 8 The goal of this paper is the exact opposite to Harper's work and seeks to understand how British state managers sought to retain Malaya within the Sterling Area. Also lacking in their accounts is a critical analysis of why it remains in Malaya's interests to remain a part of the Sterling Area and to link this with Britain's political and economic situation at the time.
Both Strange and Schenk provide accounts of the establishment of the Malayan Central
Bank in 1959, which was discussed at the negotiations over independence. 9 Where Strange argues that Britain was resistant to its establishment due to a desire to have Malaya still economically dependent on Britain, Schenk argues that Malaya was not entirely enthusiastic about the prospect of full monetary independence from the UK. Schenk argues this was due to both the potential political and economic difficulties posed by uniting Malaya with Singapore, and the desire to represent institutional continuity after independence to ensure Malaya remained an enticing location for foreign investment. While both accounts are very interesting, Strange's account provides no primary sources to support her conclusions, and Schenk's account fails to provide a critical explanation behind the logic for Malaya's reticence to enthusiastically pursue monetary independence. For example, there is no reflection upon the fact that both Malaya and Britain see continuity within the Sterling Area as a means for economic stability -it is merely presented as the reason for Malayan reluctance to pursue monetary independence 10 Furthermore, this paper, while certainly concerned with economic and monetary issues, does not intend to focus at great depth on the establishment of the Malayan Central Bank, its origins in the International Bank mission to Malaya in 1954, or the specific nature of the negotiations in its setup.
The goal of this paper is not to dismiss the literature but rather to emphasize aspects of it through an analysis of the negotiations over the political economic consequences of independence. All agree that Malaya remained important to the Sterling Area into the 1950s due to its dollar-earning capacity. 11 However, this point tends to get lost in a desire to find instances of discontinuity. Either these approaches tend to focus on the broader issue of decolonization and hence miss the specifics of each relationship 12 , or focus on the specifics of British-Malayan relations but do not interrogate the nature of that relationship. 13 As such, this paper does not reject the literature but seeks to fill a gap in understanding the relationship between Britain and Malaya. To do this, the paper will analyze the moment of the apparent shift from 'formal' to 'informal' empire, looking at the negotiations over independence, to understand how, why and on what terms Britain wanted Malaya to remain in its imperial economic domain, the Sterling Area.
Finally, it is also worth noting that, while mentioned in a number of works, close analysis of the negotiations over independence themselves is also lacking and so empirical questions can be raised: what were the key issues and problems in these negotiations? 14 How were they resolved?
And how do they tie into the broader political economic situation at the time?
Synthetic Rubber
Initially, the Constitutional Talks in London in early 1956 looked set to be dominated by the issue of imports of synthetic rubber to Britain. The Colonial Office had been approached by the Federation's Minister for Economic Affairs, who wanted to know why Britain was using the dollar pool to purchase synthetic rubber rather than simply purchasing Malayan natural rubber. 15 There was some anger in Malaya that, for all Britain's declarations of support concerning development,
Britain was unwilling to support the Malayan rubber industry with its custom. The British government had approved an import programme for 70,000 tons of synthetic rubber in 1956 from the US, which corresponded to a drop in orders for Malayan natural rubber by 70,000 tons for that
year.
The Treasury responded to the request by pointing out that the UK abided by rules common to the entire Sterling Area -dollar expenditure was acceptable as long as it was for essential purchases. Synthetic rubber imports were considered essential purchases as the efficiency and competitiveness of the UK rubber manufacturing industry relied on them. The Treasury maintained that the import programme in 1956 was not excessive and therefore was a justifiable use of dollars. The Treasury also refused to review the programme. 16 The Colonial Office sent a letter to Donald MacGillivray, the High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya, a few days after the initial Treasury response to reiterate the reasons for the synthetic rubber imports, and the stubbornness about maintaining them. In the letter, Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, emphasised that this policy was entirely consonant with Sterling Area rules but aimed ultimately at the convertibility of Sterling. This aim could not be accomplished until the Sterling Area's balance of payments had been strengthened and the only means of achieving that was to improve the efficiency, productivity and competitiveness of the British economy. The argument then proposed by the Colonial Office and the Treasury was that the import of synthetic rubber was justifiable in terms of Britain and the Sterling Area's general economic policy. 17 Average natural rubber prices in 1955 had reached a post-Korean war high of around 34p/lb., which had stimulated the competitiveness of synthetic rubber production. 18 The use of synthetic rubber was also preferred for a great deal of rubber manufacturing end uses and Lennox-Boyd argued that the import of synthetic rubber in this instance would greatly reduce the need to import any more in the future. Furthermore, since European rubber manufacturing industries had not had access to Britain's rubber markets, their industries were considerably more efficient and competitive than Britain's own. 19 While Lennox-Boyd was very eager to emphasise that Malaya's rubber and tin industries were essential to the dollar earnings of the Sterling Area, their protection could not come at the price of British and the Sterling Area's development as a whole. Indeed, the Colonial Office made clear that import controls on essential dollar imports were contrary to the Sterling Area's economic policy and also asserted that GATT obligations required that Britain should not employ quantitative import restrictions for protective purposes, despite using exactly the opposite argument in the mid-1940s to justify quantitative import restrictions. 20 The Colonial Office's final point was to say that imports of Malayan rubber into Britain were of such a small amount that swapping synthetic imports for Malayan imports would have little effect indeed. Natural rubber was principally consumed in the US market, where natural and synthetic rubber was in free competition. 21 The arguments put forward by both the Colonial Office and the Treasury to the Federation, and subsequently reiterated by the High Commissioner in Malaya, settled the matter on the specific issue of synthetic rubber imports. However, the concern over the issue was merely a manifestation of a more fundamental problem running throughout the Britain-Malaya 
Dollar Imports
In a Bank memo, a copy of the brief for the Malayan Minister for Economic Affairs was discussed by John Fisher, the Deputy Chief Cashier, Sir George Bolton, Executive Director at the Bank, and Lucius Thompson-McCausland, Adviser to the Bank's Governor, in detail. Financial issues and exchange policy were to be discussed in relation to Malaya's imports from the dollar area and its dollar spending, as well as its future financial ties with Britain and the Sterling Area. The Minister's brief contained three demands, and one offer:
• Full membership of the Sterling Area, so that Malaya will be consulted on matters of common policy and will be invited to attend Finance Ministers' meetings;
• Britain was to accept that Malaya's capital requirements were to be met in the London market, to the tune of £20m over the next five years;
• Malaya was to have freedom to import from dollar sources, and to have free access to its own dollar surplus in order to develop its economy to expand trade with neighbouring countries;
• In return for the above, Malaya would pledge full collaboration and cooperation on all matters affecting Sterling and convertibility. 22 The first demand was not discussed because it was wholly acceptable. For the second demand, the Treasury reported it could not assure the Malayan delegation that this was possible, though there were precedents for that to occur. 23 The third demand was considered the most important and an immediate issue for the Talks, and saw the Bank provide an insight into divisions on Sterling Area policy within the state management.
"If Malayan ministers press for freedom on dollar imports and if this is largely conceded (whether for political reasons or otherwise) it will make an irreparable breach in the wall of dollar restrictions around the Colonies which the Treasury seek to maintain -and which we are anxious to lower". 24 Once again, the Bank's major concern was that it would set a dangerous precedent for the Sterling Area. If this were permitted, it would be difficult to deny similar concessions to other countries (e.g. the colonies of the former British West Africa) and therefore, according to the memo, the Colonial Office too would have to abandon its current efforts to keep all Colonies on the same exchange policy. 25 The Bank then was much more committed to the Collective Approach than the Colonial Office or the Treasury, who were still committed to the maintenance of exchange controls around the Sterling Area. However, by this point, the Collective Approach had been widely accepted by British state managers and the Sterling Area and, therefore, the Bank, as Burnham argues, was much more eager to act swiftly to achieve Convertibility. 26 One possibility of getting around Malaya's demand for free dollar imports was to use Hong Kong as a 'back door' through which Malaya could buy all the dollar goods it needed. Hong Kong's special status was brought up by the Malayan delegation, since Hong Kong had much greater dollar freedom than any country in the Sterling Area. 27 However, this was because Hong Kong was an entrepot area for China, Korea, Macao, and Taiwan and sold large quantities of goods to these territories and in return received large quantities of dollars, which Hong Kong was permitted to use freely. 28 Hong Kong's dollar earnings actually provided a net contribution to the Sterling Area, while Sterling accounts in the colony were restricted and the Hong Kong government enforced this by strictly limiting the sale and purchase of Sterling. Furthermore, the Malayan dollar was linked to Sterling through statute but the Hong Kong dollar was a de facto link, with no strict basis in law. Unlike Malaya, Hong Kong was not legally obliged to back its currency with Sterling or to issue against Sterling at a fixed rate. As such, Hong Kong was seen as a very special case. 29 "A free market like Hong Kong's is contrary to the fundamental principles of the
Sterling Area and to HMG's obligations to the IMF. The arrangements in Hong
Kong are in effect a compromise between its two roles as an outlet for China and neighbouring countries and as a Sterling Area territory; they can only be justified because of the exceptional circumstances, which are of over-riding importance to the economic existence of the territory concerned." 30 It was then put to the Malayan delegation that there was no justifiable comparison between the Malayan and Hong Kong economies, which they were satisfied with. 31 John Fisher, Deputy Chief Cashier at the Bank, made one further point that the most basic and convincing argument against a Malayan free market was Malayan development. 32 Malaya required stability in order to develop and, as such, fluctuating exchange rates would run contrary to this since they would require a barrier between Malaya and the Sterling Area instead of the current statutory arrangement. 33 Given the failure of the comparison between Malaya and Hong Kong, a member of the The purpose behind this determination to achieve free use of dollars was, of course, for Malaya to expand its primary and secondary industries and a free market was seen by the Malayan delegation as attracting overseas capital to invest in the Malayan economy. However, the Bank was adamant that there was no guarantee of this and that a free market could actually encourage instability and uncertainty. 35 Further, if it were just Singapore to become a free market then exactly the same arguments applied as if Malaya as a whole wished to have a free market: exchange barriers would be required, it would strain the link between currencies, and it was 
Financial Discussions
In early June 1956, Malayan ministers met with representatives from the Eastern Banks to discuss the setting up of an investment corporation to stimulate industrial development in the Federation to the tune of M$10m. While the Banks wanted a majority government share in the corporation, the Federation government sought to have the corporation based on majority private investment. 47 The Federation was also using the terms of the creation of a Central Bank as a bargaining chip for the setting up of the investment corporation and, in a letter to the Bank of England, the Mercantile Bank felt that the setting up of the corporation revealed a desire to cut ties with Singapore. 48
While the Colonial Office admitted they were not aware of the creation of the Industrial Development Corporation, they informed the Bank that this was usual for colonies heading towards independence and there were precedents for it. However, they acknowledged that, ordinarily, the Colonial Development and Food Corporation (CDFC) would provide funds for the corporation but the Malayan government had not approached the CDFC for funds. 49 Colonel Lee also contacted the British government at this point to ask for financial aid for Malayan development; however, the Colonial Office was reticent to approve any funds unless the details of a specific development plan were provided but these had not yet been drawn up by the Lee that the British government would require an end-use certificate due to security concerns about its application; however, this would probably be meaningless and therefore he suggested using a quantitative restriction instead and proposed an initial limit of 2000 tons of rubber. 53 The embargo on rubber exports to China was ultimately relaxed. It was too difficult to get end-use agreements from the Chinese government but Malayan exports assured Sir Robert Black that their rubber exports were used only for civilian purposes. These shipments constituted the first rubber exports to China from Malaya since 1951. 54 By August, however, Britain was forced to deal with the repercussions of the nationalization of the Suez Canal, an action described in the Bank as imperilling "the survival of the UK and the Commonwealth, and represents a very great danger to Sterling". 55 A letter to the Governor of the Bank highlighted that the use of economic warfare against Egypt would be detrimental to Britain, especially to the reserves. 56 This was not catastrophic at the time, as the reserves had reached a comparative highpoint with dollar reserves at £137m and with gold reserves at £722m. 57 However, the Suez crisis, due to both economic warfare and the effect on Sterling, diminished the reserves significantly. By the end of August dollar reserves had fallen to £88m, and by the end of November had fallen again to £47m, with gold reserves at £655m. 58
By even mid-November, George Bolton, in discussion with Leslie Rowan, agreed that Britain could not continue to take losses as they had been and still hope to maintain the rate of Sterling, which was essential since if that rate could not be maintained, "there [was] a grave risk of the Sterling Area coming to an end". 59 They agreed that an appeal to the US to help maintain parity was necessary since "it is a major interest of the US to maintain Sterling and to prevent the Given Britain's weakened state following the Suez crisis, the Financial Talks were difficult.
The Malayan delegation demanded that Britain meet half the cost of the Emergency, 69 and help to meet the costs of Malaya's development plan. The Federation then asked for a £100m grant to bridge the gap between Malaya's capacity and requirements. 70 The British delegation responded starkly by saying that the British government did not and could not give direct financial aid to independent members of the Commonwealth for development since it was considered "a normal economic activity in which any independent Government must stands on its own feet" and there was a stated suspicion among the British delegation that, if the costs were spread out, the as "the fact that she chooses to convert them into Sterling and hold her reserves in that currency instead of in dollars enables her to obtain the advantages of Sterling Area membership". 82 This became a particularly pointed issue with Malaya seeking its own dollar reserves, independent from the Sterling Area's general pool, following independence. 83 Over a month after Malayan independence, Britain's reserve position was still extremely precarious, leading the Chancellor, Peter Thorneycroft, to make the following statement to the Cabinet:
"We have been near to the edge of economic disaster. We are still near the edge. Over the past two months we have lost £185 millions from our gold and 
Following independence, the Colonial Secretary submitted to Parliament his Annual
Report, detailing the events in Malaya up to 31 st August 1957. His report revealed that the Emergency had declined in seriousness in 1957 as it had in the four years previously. In fact, in July 1957, it was the first month since July 1948 in which the Communist insurgents did not kill anyone, there were also no reported casualties by the security forces in Malaya, and there were no major incidents relating to the Emergency. 85 The prosecution of the Emergency was considered by the Colonial Office to have been extremely successful with around half of the whole country declared free of insurgent activity. Indeed, by 31 st August 1957, the number of active terrorists had dropped from a peak of 8,000 in 1951 to around 1,830, with an estimated 10,000 terrorists killed, captured of surrendered since the Emergency was declared in 1948; and security forces had suffered This period particularly has been seen in terms of discontinuity. 90 However, looking at the content of the documents in both Bank and National Archives, in terms of the relationship between Britain and Malaya we see a very strong continuity. The same reasons prevail in this period that prevailed prior, and throughout this period. Moments one would think as intuitive caesuras -Schenk's de facto convertibility, Hinds and Krozewski's de jure convertibility, and the numerous phases postulated by the scholars of British imperial history and decolonisation -do not obtain. 91 Indeed, the broader interests of British capital-in-general, and the viability of Sterling as an international currency, provide a much more persuasive explanation for continuity between Britain and Malaya's relationship in this period. 92 Schenk argues that it is unfair to characterise Malayan monetary independence in terms of the shift from formal to informal empire, instead focusing on the "underlying constraints" surrounding the Malayan economy at the time. 93 However, the "economic dependence" Schenk refers to is still, at heart, the core of a historically developed and unequal imperial relationship between Britain and Malaya. This is not to dismiss Schenk's work. On the contrary, her analysis of the policy alternatives for both Britain and the rest of the Sterling Area clearly identifies the political economic conditions within which Britain manages the Sterling Area, and why the Sterling Area route was taken. 94 However, this also avoids framing the Sterling Area as an instrument of imperial rule. White, too, while acknowledging the importance of Malaya as a dollar earner within the Sterling Area beyond the 1950s, focuses instead on the erratic and discontinuous relationship between business and government, concluding that business never meaningfully influenced government, and thus rejecting the 'gentlemanly capitalism' thesis. 95 It is that importance to the Sterling Area, and the desire for British state managers to persuade Malayan state managers of that importance, that this article has sought to expand upon.
One final conclusion of this paper is the continued value of looking not only at specific relationships within the British Empire, but also considering these in terms of the broader political economy of the time. The continued value of Economic History to any study of imperial relations is well known, and has been exhorted by a recent special issue of the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History; however, it is also important to emphasise the Janus-like nature of politics and economics, and that one cannot be fully understood without the other. 96 
